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This paper applies the concept of ’cultural lag’ to 
economics. In the 1950s, economists in industrial 
countries were still under the influence of the world 
slump of the 1930s, and those in ’underdeveloped’ countries 
adopted one or another of the schools developed in the 
past overseas (Marxist or Chicago or Keynesian) . Recent 
developments, especially the rise of the transnational 
corporations and the oil price rise, have exposed the 
irrelevance of these theories for the chronic economic 
problems of today. Ways are suggested of avoiding such 
irrelevance in the future.
* A paper for the opening session of the Conference on the
relevance of economic theories, organised by the International 
Economic Association and the Polish Economic Society,
Warsaw, June 1978.
This is one in a series of working papers, intended to 
stimulate discussion on the topics covered. If you would like 
to comment on this paper, please write to the author, c/o IDS.
1T H E  C U L T U R A L  L A G  I N  E C O N O M I C S
(A paper for the opening session of the Conference on the 
relevance of economic theories, organised by the International 
Economic Association and the Polish Economic Society, Warsaw, 
June 1978.)
I was asked to provide a review of world-wide problems related 
to the.evaluation of the relevance of economic theories. The 
topic is a good one, because there is clearly growing doubt 
among students, lecturers and practitioners alike, in all 
parts of the world, about the relevance of received doctrines 
to social problems which are taking new and more severe forms, 
and increasing impatience with those who remain chained to 
obsolete models.
The concept of ’cultural lag’ is a general one: it refers to
the well-known tendency of attitudes and perceptions to lag
behind changing reality, sometimes by years, sometimes by
decades. In academia it takes the special form of reproducing
throughout one’s career the theories learned as a student,
partly through inertia (e.g. the wish to avoid rewriting
lectures and texts), partly because systems of appointment
and promotion and criteria for publication enforce some degree
of theoretical conservatism. Universities almost generate
irrelevance. In the social sciences an additional cause is
the pressure (even if only potential) from educational
bureaucracies and governments, which usually have their own
interest in current problems not being explored too deeply
and ^ may well find that theory inherited from the past suits
their purposes very well. T shall examine the cultural lag in
economics, concentrating on macro-economics, suggesting that
.his may have grown recently with tho cccelerating race of
change, and argue that we now have a rare opportunity of redu­cing it.
The state of the art two decades ago
It may be useful to start by looking back at the state of 
theory in the 1950s, and asking how relevant this has proved 
to post-war problems. That may help us see the broad direction 
in which theoretical developments need to go.
In the ’developed’ capitalist economies, Keynesian economics 
held sway, having spread rather gradually through the University
(1) because of its scope, this paper is unavoidably rather 
superficial and unscholarly. Equally inevitably, it reflects 
my personal biases in the selection of what problems and what 
theories seem significant. This is perhaps more a ’sketch’ 
than a ’review’. I am glad to acknowledge comments by 
Reginald Green and Percy Selwyn in particular.
2world., following (rather than during) the great slump of the 
1930? . A strong upward impulse was still provided in the 
1950s by the tasks of making good wartime damage and meeting 
pent-up needs . But another big slump was considered 
inevitable about a decade after the end of the war. With the 
help of the proliferating systems of national accounts, 
economists were nervously taking the pulse of the world 
economy, and sharpening the counter-cyclical tools w^ich had 
been implicit in the theories of Keynes and Kalecki  ^ . The 
post-war slump would require sophisticated ’management’ if a 
repetition of the 1930s were to be avoided. Otherwise, 
social and political problems might destroy the economic 
system.
Bitter memories of the 1930s also shaped perceptions of inter­
national policy needs. In the industrial countries, the main 
requirement was seen as one of avoiding the ’beggar my 
neighbour1 policies which had, it was believed, propogated 
the depression in 1930-33. The establishment of the Inter­
national Monetary Fund at Bretton Woods had set new ’rules of 
the game1 designed to prevent competitive devaluation and 
inhibit recourse to exchange controls; under the aegis of 
GATT, tariffs and preferences were being 'bound’ and reduced.
The older version of neo-classicism was in fact by no means 
dead, and as the years passed without a major slump it began 
to revive, especially in the United States and West Germany, 
and thus also the belief in the over-riding need to limit the 
money supply, as it had beans automatically limited by the 
rules of the gold standard .
So in the advanced capitalist countries, economists were 
preoccupied with theory which had been developed in answer to 
much earlier needs. The main line of professional progress 
was to elaborate it in increasingly complex models.
(1) It had encountered of course fierce resistance from the 
20th century residue of 19th century neo-classicism, a doctrine 
which drew its strength from the powerful surge forward of 
capitalism in the previous century. Its adherents (Pigou, for 
example) denied any inherent tendency to unemployment in the 
capitalist system.
(2) Thanks largely to the efforts of Joan Robinson, the Polish 
economist Kalecki is at last getting more credit for his simul­
taneous development of the basic theory of Maynard Keynes.
(3) In West Germany, the revival of neo-classicism was 
reinforced by memories of both the inflation of the 1920s and 
the state controls adopted by the Nazis in the 1930s.
3It would of course be presumptuous of me, especially as a 
guest in Poland, to discuss how international or internal 
problems were perceived then in the socialist countries, or 
how relevant to them was Marxism, the other main neo­
classical school. Nor can much be said on how they were 
viewed by the economics profession in the 'West*, because they 
were considered a world apart - out of reach, in various 
senses, and only studied by a few specialists.
In the 1930s, there was also a small group at work on the 
problems of Underdeveloped’ countries. In retrospect, the 
economics profession had been blind in the colonial era to 
the scale of world poverty: there had been little study of
economies other than those of Europe and North America, or 
of the world economy as a whole, despite its increasing 
integration. (International trade theory covers after all 
only one aspect). After the war, developments overseas 
(especially the independence of India) stimulated professional 
concern about conditions in poor countries for various reasons, 
partly humanitarian, partly political (based on a fear that 
decolonisation would be followed by revolution and the 
destruction of the world economic system). Associated with 
this was a new perception of the world as divided into three 
qualitatively different groups of countries - ’developed 
market economies’, ’centrally-planned economies’ and ’under­
developed’, later called ’developing' economies.
’Development economists’ were in fact mostly nationals not of 
’underdeveloped’ but of the ’developed’ countries (though 
there were notable exceptions such as Arthur Lewis, Prebisch 
and Mahalanobis) , and they saw the central question as how 
the ’underdeveloped’ countries could follow in the footsteps 
of the ’developed’ and quickly achieve the same economic 
prosperity and independence, social welfare systems and 
parliamentary democracy, including institutional protection 
for human rights. ’Development’ was essentially an economic 
problem. Economic growth was considered a suitable yardstick 
for it (indeed almost a synonym). In the end, growth would 
mean reduced inequality, unemployment and poverty (viz the 
Kuznets ’U-curve*). Such progress would be all the easier 
because the necessary technologies were already available - 
although medical technology had made the economic task more 
difficult by enabling the growth of population to accelerate.
The Harrod-Domar model, which had recently been elaborated 
(though primarily to make Keynesian economics dynamic, not 
for the sake of the ’underdeveloped' countries) provided a 
convenient framework for relating economic growth to invest­
ment. This led to a heavy emphasis on the need for savings,
(1) Kalecki played a part in this too, by developing the 
United Nations World Economic Report in the early 1950s.
4and thus for aid and foreign investment, which would bring 
with them the latest technologies. Indeed, much work at that 
time consisted of building growth models which inter alia 
justified aid and guided the policies of donor agencies.
Although ’development economics’ had its professional roots 
in ’developed* countries and was largely articulated by their 
economists, it helped - together with Keynesian and neo­
classical economics - to shape the minds of the new generation 
of ’Third World’ economists and political leaders. These had 
mostly been students in one of the ’developed’ countries (or 
in universities at home which had copied their syllabi). In 
a sense, their theoretical equipment was twice removed from 
reality - it reflected the doctrines developed for other 
countries in response to earlier events.
The chief theoretical schools of Europe and North America 
promoted their own recipes for accelerating growth as univer­
sally valid. At one extreme, the Chicago school (Simon 
Rottenberg, for example, teaching then in Santiago, soon to 
be followed by Harberger, or disciples such as Peter Bauer at 
work in West Africa) argued for opening the doors to foreign 
trade and investment and avoiding planning and controls. IMF 
economists, from the same stable, saw inflation and payments 
problems - already widespread, especially in Latin America - 
as due to lack of monetary discipline. If this were put right, 
the basis would be established for a fast growth of output and 
employment.
Prebisch and Singer, however, developed a thesis with very 
different policy implications, based on an apparent chronic 
tendency for.the terms of trade of primary producers to 
deteriorate, which led to an emphasis on industrialisation 
and justified tariff protection. This thesis fitted another 
theme of that time, namely that, to break out of historical 
stagnation, a simultaneous ’big push’ was necessary, with the 
investment in each sector reinforcing and justifying invest­
ment in the others, which implied the need for ’planning'.
It also helped explain the widening ’gap’ between the incomes 
of ’developed’ and ’underdeveloped' countries and reinforced 
the case for aid. This case was further strengthened by the 
argument of Rostow, that an injection of capital could make 
growth ’self-sustaining’.
On the Left were Marxists like Baran who also stressed indus­
trialisation (referring to the Soviet model) but who, in 
contrast to Prebisch, believed that socialism was a necessary
(1) Actually, a stronger case lay in the lower income elasti- 
cies of demand for primary products: this is especially
obvious now that subsequent research has thrown doubt on the 
empirical basis of the 'terms of trade' thesis.
and very feasible condition for removing obstacles to growth. 
This approach has tended to lead to a classification of 
’underdeveloped’ countries by degree of socialism. It also 
suggested to some that fundamental and lasting worldwide 
growth would require and impel worldwide revolution, encom­
passing also the imperial powers themselves.
Although there were profound differences among development 
economists, there were also common elements. It is not much 
of an exaggeration to say that a single frame of perception 
covered almost the whole ideological spectrum.
The belief in growth was of course convenient for all those 
who wanted to divert attention from the concentration of 
income (and economic power) in the hands of particular races 
or regions, but it was also theoretically acceptable to others 
with no such desire, including Marxists. There was almost 
universal emphasis, too, on capital accumulation as the source 
of growth. Product and factor markets were (usually tacitly) 
assumed to be sufficiently competitive to validate market 
prices. The essential variables were believed to be quanti­
fiable and the role of the economist was seen as a technical 
one of incorporating them in ’development plans’ (in reality 
growth plans.) Such,plans assumed the validity of the 
statistics available . They also generally ignored the 
constraints on policy and the need for institutional change.
Another common characteristic of economists of those times 
(whether Marxists or members of the Chicago school) was a 
basic optimism. Inequalities within and between countries 
could and would in one way or another be reduced eventually, 
bringing an homogenised, modernised world within the reach of 
the next generation. Supply curves for oil and other indust­
rial inputs were tacitly assumed to be flat, as they had been 
for decades. Nationdist aspirations and policies were ignored 
or deprecated as obstructive - in part a reaction against what 
was seen as a cause of the two great wars.
(1) Actually, in mainly rural societies, i.e. in most of the 
world, measures of economic growth are largely hypothetical, 
because of the lack of regular statistics on economic activi­
ties in rural areas, especially construction, manufacturing 
and services. This does not stop economists using estimates 
of growth as if they were facts. (Such statistical diffi­
culties are of course in a different category from those of 
interpreting aggregative indicators covering a great diversity 
of classes, races, etc.). See ’’Urban Bias: Seers versus
Lipton" (IDS Discussion Paper No. 116. 1977).
6These similarities are not surprising since Marxist and other 
neo-classical doctrines all had their intellectual roots in 
the expanding European economy of the 19th century.
The capacity of theory to explain recent developments
( 2 )This whole set of doctrines is of course now in ruins.
In the first place, the ’developed1 countries turned out not 
to have even nearly solved their social problems. The problems 
of submerged minorities (the Blacks in the United States, 
Southerners in Italy, etc.) became more visible and politi­
cally significant. The expectations aroused by modern 
technology for both consumption patterns and working condi­
tions, and disseminated through the media, could not be U
universally realised. Far from economic growth being a 
panacea, it seems to have been associated with growing crime, 
drug addiction, alcoholism, etc. It creates a society 
difficult to administer (because of inter-connections too 
complex for any input-output table) but easy to sabotage by 
strikes in key sectors, kidnapping of leaders, etc. It al3o 
involves serious environmental damage.
In brief, in the 1950s the economists of the industrial 
countries misperceived the problems as essentially cyclical - 
events have shown that they are essentially structural. In 
some countries, notably Britain, the basic problem was really 
adapting the socio-economic structure to a new and less privi­
leged status, especially revitalising industry. When the 
major world depression did at last come, in the mid-1970s, 
the ’developed’ countries started to experience inflation 
plus unemployment in a combination which had previously been 
considered characteristic of a number of ’developing’ countries, 
especially in Latin America, and which was difficult to recon­
cile with Keynesian economics. Economic expansion now seems 
constricted by price inflation and related foreign exchange 
deficits . In any one country these can be moderated by 
productivity increases but then there is little net addition 
to employment. Moreover, the unemployed are not necessarily 
willing, nor are they compelled, to take unpleasant or boring 
j obs .
(1) See ’’The congruence of Marxism and other neo-classical 
doctrines” by myself in ’’Towards a New Strategy of Develop­
ment” (Pergammon, to be published in 1979). Also IDS Discus­
sion Paper 138.
TD One might argue that neo-classical ’rules of the game’ 
in international economics are not at all irrelevant for 
technologically strong countries, in this case especially the 
United States and West Germany (and now Japan), which need 
to break down nationalist barriers to their economic expansion. 
In these countries, too, the higher degree of factor mobility 
makes Chicago-type models at least less obviously inappropriate. 
This doctrine also remains useful for capitalists in any 
country who need arguments against state ’interference’.
7So the global ’management’ techniques devised in response to 
the general demand deficiencies of the 1930s, and embodied in 
the sophisticated models of the 1930s and 1960s, turned out 
after all to be of limited relevance, as did - at least in the 
view of many - the monetarist policies which partially took 
their place. Government economists in Western Europe tend to 
see the solution outside - in the renewed expansion of Japan 
and the U.S.A. But the stage has not after all been set for 
a steadily expanding world economy, despite the new institu­
tions to stimulate the liberalisation of trade and payments.
The uneven development of the main capitalist economies in 
the 1960s, with Japan and West Germany achieving particularly 
fast productivity increases, has undermined the post-war 
economic order. Following the Smithsonian conference, the 
monetary rules of the game were changed by the governments of 
the very countries which had earlier insisted on their strict 
implementation, and subsequently trade liberalisation was 
checked or reversed (e.g. by textile quotas). Indeed, the 
’New Cambridge’ school (Godley and Cripps), following earlier 
work by Frisch and Balogh, argue that protection (discrimin­
ating between sources of imports) will help to restore the 
expansion of the world economy, not hinder it.
Heavy and persistent unemployment in the advanced industrial 
countries has not proved as destructive as conservatives and 
liberals had feared and revolutionaries hoped. The capitalist 
system seems remarkably robust and able to survive many final 
crises. But the social costs of chronic unemployment are so 
heavy (and the political effects likely to become so traumatic) 
that we urgently require if not ’another Keynes’ (or Kalecki), 
which may be impossible, at least big analytical innovations.
Doctrines in the ’development’ field have not fared any better. 
The Harrod-Domar model was undoubtedly a technical advance, 
but it was too simplistic to provide an adequate basis for 
explaining or predicting even growth. Already, at the end of 
the 1950s, the range in national incremental capital-output 
ratios implied, as did research on production functions, that 
there were other influences on growth - e.g. education. This 
was demonstrably a major requirement in Africa: it led to
a new subject, manpower economics, and reinforced the political 
pressures for a big expansion in secondary and tertiary 
education which were already considerable, indeed in retro­
spect excessive.
Economic growth has, in fact, been fast by historical standards 
in most countries of the ’Third World’; but we now see that 
no mechanisms? evolutionary or revolutionary, can be relied 
on to spread its benefits and ease social problems. Overt 
unemployment and associated emigration can increase even in 
(perhaps especially in) fast-growing economies, such as 
Jamaica and Puerto Rico. The expected tendency to equality 
has not appeared even in countries where income levels have 
become much higher than they were in Britain a century ago,
8when the benefits of growth began to be widely dispersed. 
Concentration of economic power in the hands of capitalists, 
landowners, the bureaucracy and the labour artistocracy (the 
composition of the ruling coalition of classes varying from 
country to country) seems in general to have increased, not 
declined: so have associated urban-rural disparities,
especially in social services. Pakistan was merely the
most dramatic case of a country disrupted by inter alia fast 
growth. ' '
Such results were implicit in growth strategies that relied 
on capital-intensive import substitution, the benefits of 
which reached few sectors of the economy. Moreover, economic 
growth on this pattern has provided both the motivation and 
the resources for repression, which is also facilitated by 
imported technologies of surveillance, interrogation, police 
communications, crowd control, etc. In turn the erosion of 
parliamentary democracy has facilitated the concentration of 
economic power, including income.
It may be argued that it is not obligatory (perhaps not even 
desirable) for economists to venture into such ’non­
economic1 issues,.but if there are observable and recurrent 
socio-economic patterns, is it defensible for these to be 
ignored?
In the 1970s, it is true, interesting,work was done on the 
compatibility of growth and equality, in a relatively rapid 
response to growing awareness of the inadequancy of growth as 
such and there was an associated emergence of interest in 
’basic needs * . But a big question mark hangs over this line 
of work, not about its economic rationale but about the 
realism of expecting those with economic and political power 
to yield it voluntarily.
(1) Though the distribution of even the most quantifiable 
element in economic power, income, cannot be measured in 
predominantly rural economies because of statistical weak­
nesses mentioned above. In countries with sizeable 
bureaucracies, allowance also has to be made for use of 
official cars, housing and educational privileges, government 
hospitality, access to foreign exchange at legal rates, etc. 
especially since these forms of income are non-taxable. In 
addition, of course, bureaucrats control the distribution of 
government services, recruitment to employment, allocation of 
contracts, etc. which can provide additional income as well 
as a degree of control over the lives of fellow citizens 
comparable to that of large property owners.
(2) E.g. in "Redistribution with Growth" (Ed. by Chenery et 
al. published by Oxford University Press, for IBRD and ID3T
197*0 .
9Moreover, though foreign-financed industrialisation has left 
most countries less dependent on a narrow range of primary 
exports, they have become - the smaller ones especially - 
much more dependent on imports of technology, equipment, 
energy and intermediate products, as well as on foreign 
capital, which come increasingly via the transnational 
corporations, or TNCs. The TNCs fit badly into the neo­
classical model. A large proportion of economic transactions, 
especially in international trade, are internal to the firm. 
Moreover the TNCs have so much expertise available (in 
advertising, legal and tax departments, as well as those 
containing scientists and engineers), that they can manipulate 
market forces to a considerable extent, and governments - 
including ’their own’ - find them hard to monitor or tax, let 
alone control. To rely heavily on their capital and technology 
for economic growth, therefore, means in fact allowing them 
to influence its pattern, including the origin and price of 
imports, the destination of exports, etc. Governments which 
have attempted to force the TNCs to conform to national 
interests (e.g. the decisions in Cuba in 1959, or later in 
Sri Lanka, to import Soviet Oil) have had to face politico- 
economic retaliation. Attention was drawn to the political 
and military linkages (including aid) that restrict the 
liberty of governments, again especially of small countries, 
to choose their sources of capital, technology and industrial 
inputs. This was the background to the emergency of the 
dependencia school in Latin America, the first truly indige­
nous one outside Europe - though drawing to some extent on 
European theorists, especially Marx. Developing an earlier 
insigntxOf Prebisch, Latin Americans (Cardoso, Furtado,
Pinto^ ) saw the world as divided between a core of industrial 
countries and a periphery.
The clear inappropriateness of many (not all) modern technolo­
gies to the requirements of the ’Third World’ raised the 
question why architects, engineers, doctors, etc. so often 
adopt them, and why this is tolerated by bureaucrats in 
government or public corporations. Why are syllabi in higher 
education, including economics, modelled on those of countries 
with quite different needs? And why are patterns of consump­
tion that are capital-intensive, fuel-intensive and import­
intensive, copied so widely?
(1) A small school of ’plantation' theorists (Beckford, Best, 
Girvan, Thomas, etc.) in the Anglophone Caribbean, adopted a 
somewhat similar approach, but emerged independently - largely 
because of the linguistic inaccessibility of the dependence 
theorists. More Marxist variants of the dependence school 
were provided by Frank and Samir Amin.
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These questions pointed to the importance of further factors 
that are *non-economic’ but inseparably connected to the 
•economic*. Cultural dependence shapes the pattern of even 
material progress, both directly and via the mind of the 
policymaker - who thus ceases to be an autonomous agent, as 
he has generally been considered in the past . This 
provided the clue to why the historical models of the 
•developed* countries (capitalist or socialist) could not be 
copied - as had been widely hoped in the 1950s. During 
embryonic stages in their evolution, these countries had not 
been exposed to pervasive communication media disseminating 
attractive foreign life styles, techniques and theories.
This line of thinking stimulated many economists to take an 
interest in China which was (at that time anyway) following 
an autarcnic and egalitarian policy, though with results hard 
as yet to evaluate, let alone assimilate into theory.
The successful action of OPEC governments at the end of 1973 
in raising the price of oil more than three-fold taught us 
further lessons. It exposed the danger of following economic 
models implying rapid industrialisation, unless energy 
resources were adequate, and reminded us of the finite limits 
to reserves of fossil fuels. While some governments of rich 
countries may be able to prolong growth by resorting to nuclear 
power, it would be financially out of the question for the 
poorer oil importers to solve their energy problems in this 
way. Despite the recent fall in fertility, their population 
will double within the next 30 years. Techniques of harnessing 
solar, tidalj geothermal or wind power will - even if econo­
mically feasible - take at best decades to develop and dis­
seminate on a worldwide scale.
These dangers had already been stressed by ecologists, notably 
in ’Club of Rome’ documents, but in an exaggerated and sens­
ational way, so that few professional economists felt the need 
to take such warnings seriously. Yet there has apparently
(1) A doctoral thesis at Sussex by Chandra Randeni of the 
Bank of Sri Lanka, using official records to compare major 
projects aided by capitalist and socialist donors in the 1960s, 
shows that both groups were oblivious to the employment impact 
of their projects in a country with severe unemployment (which 
many projects aggravated) and the implications of this for 
choice of technology in either construction or operation.
Both similarly made no allowance whatever for the effects on 
income distribution or on the country’s economic dependence.
In all projects, the only criterion used was how to maximise 
income, relative to purely financial costs. It is true that 
the Sri Lankan negotiators did not raise the real issues, so 
in a sense the responsibility is in part theirs, but then one 
must ask where they were educated and given a belief in the 
overriding importance of productive forces?
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been a major qualitative change in the world economy. The 
dream of a completely ’modern’ world, even in the next 
century, has started to evaporate. We are entering an era 
in which long-term supply curves can no longer be assessed 
flat, one full of potential conflict.
Secure sources, especially of oil and uranium, are of para­
mount importance. In such a world, not at all benign, the 
level of living of a worker depends in large measure on the 
bargaining power of his or her government . Nationalism can 
no longer be ignored, nor can the nature of the state.
’Self reliance* is naturally a common aspiration, as are the 
restructuring of the international order and the search for 
’alternative* development strategies, eschewing capitalist or 
solicalist economic models.
One cannot say that the cultural lag has disappeared. 
Developments in the middle of the 1970s have revealed the 
increasing professional irrelevance of the grouping of 
countries into three ’worlds’. At the end of the 19^0s, when 
this classification was devised, advanced capitalist states 
typically had few public corporations and their regulating 
agencies were generally weak, whereas in socialist countries 
decision-making was heavily centralised. The latter were, 
moreover, importing little merchandise, technology or capital 
from the former. In the 1970s, the capitalist/socialist 
dichotomy has become less sharp or significant, trade and 
investment between them have increased (including a few joint 
ventures between TNCs and East European governments) and 
political tension has been relaxed.
In addition, the separation of ’developed’ countries from 
’underdeveloped’ has become increasingly obsolete as several 
countries in the ’Third World’ have reached income levels 
above Portugal and other countries in Southern Europe previously 
classified as ’developed’. The oil price rose, in particular, 
provided countries like Kuwait and Abu Dhabi with per capita 
incomes among the highest in the world. The ’Third World’ 
covers today too wide a variety of countries to have much 
conceptual significance.
The increasing differentiation has also undermined some core­
periphery models - almost before European economists realised 
they existed. It is true that all ’peripheral’ countries are
12
still/net importers of technology, capital equipment and 
arms, but then the same could be said oI\the majority of 
countries up to now classified as 'core* .
In all countries, 'developed1 as well as ’developing’, capit- 
alist or socialist, there is a lust for the products of modern 
technology, but technological progress facilitates the concen­
tration of economic power (in geographical as well as social 
terms), destroys earlier (sometimes more humane) formSsOf 
production, causes unemployment (open or disguised), 
requires the migration and retraining of labour, uses both 
capital and energy heavily, poses environmental problems, 
and spreads anomie.
Everywhere in the world, various analogous problems are being 
raised by what might be termed the contradictions generated in 
technical advance, and no body of economic theory is well 
equipped to deal with them - certainly not those grounded in 
19th century Europe,
Towards more relevant theory
The general lesson of this review is that the adjustment of 
theory to reality is still delayed, often leading to danger­
ously inappropriate analyses and policies. One is reminded 
of the saying that generals tend to fight the previous war.
If political leaders have used our prescriptions, e.g. by 
promoting growth, this has been because they have found these 
convenient rather than illuminating. However, some are now - 
as in the 1930s - desperate enough actually to feel in need 
of some professional guidance. We can, moreover, for the
(1) In countries that count themselves as ’developing’, there 
are also historic resentments against the former colonial 
powers; these too may be receding in practical effect as they 
are replaced by grievances against all countries, whether 
capitalist or socialist, which benefit from ’unequal exchange’, 
to use the phrase of Emanuel, who pointed to the theoretical 
implications (especially for Marxism) of the enormous and 
still growing difference in wage levels between ’developed’ 
and 'developing' countries.
(2) The sub-class of 'socialist' economies within the ’per­
iphery* has proved difficult to identify, as is shown by 
frequent reclassifications, e.g. of Egypt.
(3) In production units which are not responsive to market 
prices, especially public corporations, the problem appears 
as ’disguised* unemployment - i.e. excess labour and low 
productivity.
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first time foresee some of the major characteristics of the 
world in the 1990s, which may help us avoid further theore­
tical lags. It willj for example, be a world short of fossil 
fuels, and more heavily dependent on the technology of the 
TNCs. The imminent massive introduction of very cheap silicon 
chip micro-processors threatens to bring a new and more intense 
phase of international competition, unemployment and other 
social problems (while also holding out - as the latest 
technology always does - the promise of great benefits). 
Multilateralism is likely to be further weakened.
What are the implications for making economic theories more 
relevant, and university syllabi more appropriate, to today's 
problems - and if possible to those of the next two decades?
The first is the need to recognise that, while problems take 
different forms in different countries, there are theoret­
ically significant common elements, arising out of the impact 
of similar, worldwide, technological changes. 'Development' 
is no longer just the problem of the tropics: the economists
of advanced capitalist and socialist countries could learn 
much from their colleagues elsewhere - if they were prepared 
to. The growing irrelevance of the 3-World classification 
suggests for some purposes, at least, that we need world 
models which, like that of Sunkel, do not deal only with 
national units, but are 'transnational systems' running across 
national boundaries, and with many non-economic dimensions.
Yet, and secondly, economics cannot be carried very far in 
generalities, ignoring the specific national context. Any 
usable national model incorporates the socio-economic charac­
teristics of that nation - such as historically determined 
classes and ethnic groups, political institutions and social 
attitudes, structures of output and employment, etc. A 
student needs models based on the special nature of his or 
her country’s economy. This implies making the discipline 
much less ’a prioristic’.
Thirdly, of especial importance are the determinants of the 
national room to manoeuvre. These do indeed include economic 
factors, such as whether a country is industrialised, and 
whether its economy is planned. However, more basic - because 
they affect those factors too - are the following unalterable 
determinants, which have not so far been stressed, even by the 
dependence school, though their importance has been demon­
strated by recent events^':
(1) There may be some tendency to play down the importance of 
these geographical factors by those who wish to emphasise the 
overriding importance of social change. However, the serious 
effects on the Cuban economy of the recent fluctuations in 
world sugar prices, especially the re-emergence of unemploy­
ment, remind us that certain realities cannot be ignored.
- Size (both area and population) ;
- Location (proximity to more powerful countries, access to 
oceans , etc ) ;
- Resource base (arable land, oil and minerals, etc).
These could lead to more useful typologies than the old 'Three 
World' classification, e.g. to models for petroleum economies, 
for more advanced industrial countries, and for small countries.
Fourthly, the agenda must clearly now also include a number of 
non-economic determinants of autonomy, and therefore of 
national development in all types of country, which are subject 
to policy, at least in the long term. These can be very 
briefly noted here:
- Technological (the size and quality of scientific manpower 
and institutions, civil and military and their capacity to 
select appropriate technologies, if necessary excluding or 
preventing the development of those that are inappropriate);
- Political (including an appreciation of the aims and resources 
of TNCs and of the governments of more powerful countries, 
and a willingness to exploit bargaining assets);
- Military (an arms industry, local military expertise, and 
thus a capacity to withstand great power pressures);
- Cultural (e.g. use of the main national language, proportions 
of films and TV programmes made nationally, and,the effect
of the system of education on national unity).
Such determinants of development have up to now been hardly 
noticed by economists in any part of the world: even the
theory and practice of planning take little account of them.
They have no place in the main theories which were built for 
qualitatively different situations. A final implication is 
to reinforce the rather hackneyed point that economics is not 
a separate subject (especially not 'development economics'). 
Analyses that use purely economic determinants, even of 
economic variables (such as growth), now run even greater 
dangers of serious distortion. This applies not only to
(1) Cultural autonomy is perhaps of a different order of 
importance from the others, because a country without the 
pre-conditions for it can have little political basis for 
economic theories relevant to their own circumstances or 
for development strategies designed to increase autonomy 
in other fields.
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’macro’ but also ’micro’ analysis - e.g. project evaluation.
We can appreciate afresh the merits in the traditional subject, 
'political economy’, though naturally this now needs broaden­
ing to take account of the actual and theoretical trends of 
recent decades, and to give due weight to current political, 
military and especially cultural influences, which can no 
longer be grouped in a passive ’superstructure'. Unless 
teachers of economics refer to relevant 'non-economic' factors, 
they are really misleading their students.
It will not be easy to develop economics in ways more appro­
priate to this part of the 20th century. For economists in 
all parts of the world, professional innovation is - as in 
past decades - painful and strenuous. Yet surely there are 
signs of the profession being humiliated as accepted models 
become obsolete and incapable of throwing much light on the 
problems that so badly need solution.
(1) See the note on aid projects in Sri Lanka, above.
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